CTC TRENDS

Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)

No. 98-20 SEP 98



4QFY97 & 1QFY98

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)
U. S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-1350

CTC Trends for JRTC 4QFY97 & 1QFY98

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TA.5 INTELLIGENCE BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are *not* in any priority order.)

Positive Performance

TREND 1: Crater analysis. Commanders at all levels are becoming more aware of the importance of conducting crater analysis after the receipt of opposing force (OPFOR) indirect fires. The information being provided in the shell report is being passed to the S-2 to conduct predictive counter-mortar analysis of the enemy situation. This information has led to the successful capture of several OPFOR mortars during the low-intensity conflict (LIC) phase.

(*TA 5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)*

TREND 2: Analysis and control team (ACT) integration into the brigade tactical operations center (TOC). Military intelligence companies continue to benefit from integration of the ACT into the physical layout of the brigade TOC. In doing so, intelligence analysts are able to participate in TOC battle drills and maintain a high degree of situational awareness. The most successful configurations locate the ACT adjacent to the brigade S-2, facilitating analytical cross-talk and battle tracking.

(TA 5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

TREND 3: Battlefield area and threat evaluation. S-2s and their supporting management of information control officer (MICO) continue to arrive at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) with a clear understanding of the enemy's capabilities and limitations, as well as a good macro level understanding of the terrain and its effects on both friendly and enemy operations.

(TA 5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

TREND 4: Development of the battalion situation template. The battalion S-2s are becoming noticeably more effective at predicting enemy locations and activities. This is especially true during the initial entry/movement to contact phase of operations, when S-2s regularly refine the division and brigade enemy situation template to the level where individual mortar firing positions are located. On more than one occasion, these templates have proven remarkably accurate, often missing the locations of high-payoff targets by less than 100 meters.

(TA 5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

TREND 5: Staff integration. S-2s solicit input from other staff members on battalion and brigade staffs about enemy employment of enemy battlefield operating systems (BOSs). In particular, input from the fire support and air defense representatives consistently improves the S-2 portrayal of enemy employment of these systems.

(TA 5.3.1.2 Consider Enemy Doctrine)

TREND 6: Mine template. Units have demonstrated a marked proficiency in templating the locations of enemy minefields. Usually produced as a joint endeavor between the battalion S-2 and the engineer platoon leader, many recent templates have accurately predicted the locations of more than half of the enemy's minefields.

(TA 5.4 Prepare and Disseminate Intelligence Reports)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Use of scouts. Scouts must be involved in reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units continue to have difficulty with the employment of their scouts in the execution of their R&S plans.
2. R&S planning is often conducted independent of the daily targeting meeting and seems to be an afterthought to the course-of-action development process rather than the driver for situation development and confirmation.

RESULT: Poor use of the scouts produces real time intelligence lacking the necessary situational development and not confirming intelligence already gathered by other means.

Techniques:

1. The planning staff identifies a dedicated R&S planning group (i.e., S-3 air, battle information coordination center (BICC), fire support NCO (FSNCO), medical platoon leader) to develop priority intelligence requirements (PIR) for continued planning and an R&S plan to confirm the enemy situation template immediately following mission analysis.
2. Reference: **FM 7-92, *The Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad.*** Chapter 1, discusses the relationship between the battalion staff and the scout platoon during planning, while Chapter 2 focuses on the battalion's role in command and control (C^2) of the reconnaissance platoon.

(TA 5.2 Collect Information)

TREND 2: Terrain products. Divisions are now deploying elements of their organic terrain analysis detachments to support maneuver commanders and intelligence officers.

PROBLEMS:

1. Commanders and their staffs are not familiar with the capabilities and limitations of terrain teams.
2. Commanders do not routinely request a package of standard terrain analysis products to support operations.
3. These products, once delivered, are not generally "pushed" to the rotational unit because of the lack of habitual training relationships.

RESULT: Units do not use the tools available to determine the impact of terrain on operations. Notable examples include the impact of terrain on:

- Mobility.
- Direct fire engagement for long-range weapons.
- Line-of-sight communications.
- Locations of suitable water sources.
- The rain and its effect on the strength of local soils.

Techniques:

1. Review **FM 34-130,** ***Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield***.
2. Request standard terrain analysis from the division terrain team and train extensively on its use.
3. Integrate slice element requirements, such as civil affairs and psychological operations, into terrain analysis requests in accordance with **FM 34-36,** ***Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations.***

(TA 5.2.1 Collect Information on Situation)

TREND 3: Human intelligence (HUMINT) collection. Employment of HUMINT assets must be planned and executed in a timely manner.

PROBLEMS:

1. The HUMINT section organic to the MI direct support company continues to be under utilized and poorly focused.
2. Brigade and battalion S-2s do not understand how to employ HUMINT assets, and they consistently fail to incorporate teams on the brigade collection and battalion reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plans.
3. MI company commanders fail to relate HUMINT capabilities and limitations to supported maneuver commanders and routinely lose focus of detached HUMINT teams.

RESULTS:

1. When HUMINT information is gathered, it rarely makes it way to the analysis control team (ACT) in a timely manner.

2. During civil military operations, brigade and battalion commanders entrust civil affairs (CA) attachments with intelligence collection and fail to include HUMINT soldiers in the collection planning process.

Techniques:

1. MI company commanders must increase their focus on HUMINT planning. The key to success is for the R&S platoon leader, in conjunction with the interrogation and counterintelligence technicians, to develop specific HUMINT collection guidance.

2. While at Home Station, the HUMINT section must coordinate with the supported battalion S-2 sections and provide them with the capabilities and limitations of civilian internee (CI)/HUMINT teams.

3. Comprehensive standing operating procedures (SOP), which address specific missions and reports that the teams are required to execute, must be developed and utilized.

(TA 5.2.1.3 Collect Information on Social/Political/Economic Environment)

TREND 4: Intelligence input to targeting. The targeting meeting is essential in working out the targeting priorities and details.

PROBLEMS:

1. S-2s and their supporting management of the information control officer (MICO) still do not provide detailed future projections of enemy courses of action to commanders and staffs during the targeting process.

2. The S-2s are not prepared for the targeting meetings.

RESULTS:

1. A major cause of this is lack of preparation for targeting meetings. S-2s arrive at the targeting meeting not prepared to discuss recent battle damage assessment (BDA), R&S results, or collection asset availability.

2. The S-2s do not have situation and event templates of probable enemy activities for the targeting period.

Techniques:

1. A technique to improve this consistent shortcoming is to make the items listed above--BDA, R&S results, collection asset availability, and template of future activities--a part of the section's internal updates.

2. If each of these items is updated several times a day, recent products will always be available for use in either a targeting process or to support any future planning. No lengthy preparation specifically for a targeting session would be required.

(TA 5.2.2 Collect Target information)

TREND 5: The targeting process. The targeting team must combine the indicators to determine the best use of unit assets.

PROBLEMS:

1. Most units do not suffer from a lack of intelligence concerning enemy activity, but from the lack of an established methodology for turning enemy intelligence into friendly action.
2. The targeting team is unable to combine the numerous indicators, arrive at a decision about the mortar's likely location, and mass combat power against what is clearly a high-payoff target.

RESULTS:

1. The most common scenario is that of an enemy mortar located within 200-300 meters of the S-2's template location.
2. Over a period of days, the mortar is acquired by the Q36 on one or more occasion (displacing prior to counter-battery fires), is heard by scouts or infantry, is resupplied by enemy aircraft, and fires on friendly units on multiple occasions (although a subsequent crater analysis is rare).

Technique: The unit targeting process methodologies must be worked out in Home Station training with all subordinate units participating. The unit's SOP should reflect the methodology chosen and should mirror the training lessons derived from practicing the techniques.

(TA 5.2.2 Collect Target Information)

TREND 6: The targeting meeting. The targeting and synchronization meeting is an important tool used by maneuver brigades and battalions during rotations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Chemical officers generally are not involved in this process.
2. The targeting and synchronization process allows the brigade to ensure the effective servicing of targets as well as the integration and synchronization of all the brigade's battlefield operating systems.
3. Many commanders use the targeting and synchronization process to drive their operations. One of the products that comes out of the meeting is a FRAGO.

RESULTS:

1. The NBC officer not involved in the process is not effective nor are the assets he oversees.
2. The chemical officer must be involved if he is going to have any timely influence on the battle from a NBC standpoint.

Techniques:

1. The chemical officer must be involved in the process.
2. A reference to help him understand the process is **FM 6-30-10, *The Targeting Process*.**

(TA 5.2.2 Collect Target Information)

TREND 7: Collection management by the S-2.

PROBLEMS:

1. Task force S-2s at brigade and battalion level do not manage their collection assets well.
2. The leading cause of this is that S-2s are often not well-practiced in the basic techniques discussed in **FM 34-2, *Collection Management*.**
3. Additionally, S-2s are often unaware of the capabilities and limitations of the systems at their disposal.

RESULTS:

1. S-2s do not consider all systems on the battlefield as collectors.
2. This leads to systems being underemployed or expected to perform tasks well beyond the capabilities of the system.

Techniques:

1. To reverse this trend, S-2s should review and practice staff training exercises using the techniques discussed in FM 34-2.
2. S-2s must familiarize themselves and their soldiers with the basic capabilities and limitations of each system. The MICO commander and his soldiers are the best place to look for this expertise.
3. The S-2 section's field SOP and the tools used during collection management should prompt the S-2 to consider assets not often tasked, such as the FSB and other support units.

(TA 5.3 Process Information)

TREND 8: Force protection. Units must identify enemy capabilities and take action necessary for force protection.

PROBLEMS:

1. Firing batteries/platoons routinely do a poor job of identifying enemy capabilities and taking the necessary force protection measures to eliminate or counteract the threat.
2. Identifying the threat and developing a plan to reduce enemy-inflicted casualties is a continued weakness.
3. Most units have difficulty with the threat analysis and identifying new enemy capabilities that occur during mission transition from contingency operations to a mid-intensity conflict.

Techniques:

1. Develop battle drills for actions upon contact: enemy in the wire, enemy within the perimeter, mines, air attack, chemical attack, sniper, terrorist, indirect fire, and armored vehicles (special munitions procedures).

2. Refine and rehearse convoy procedures, use of counter-reconnaissance patrols, fire planning along routes and around the perimeter, obstacle employment, fire base operations, terrain gun positioning, and the use of engineer assets.

3. Read and review **FM 6-50*, Fire Support in the Airland Battle,*** and **FM 6-20-1, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battalion*.**

(TA 5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

TREND 9: Template the chemical threat.

PROBLEMS:

1. Chemical personnel at both brigade and battalion often fail to produce a template of where, based upon their analysis, they suspect the possible employment of chemical agents on the battlefield.

2. A sound template will drive the NBC decontamination and reconnaissance effort. The chemical officer must possess an understanding of how the enemy fights; this can be found in the enemy order of battle.

RESULT: Once the chemical officer understands the enemy order of battle, he need only conduct reverse analysis to ascertain where he thinks the enemy will employ agents and then depict these locations on his template.

Techniques:

1. The chemical officer must design a decontamination and reconnaissance plan that covers the depth and width of his battlespace.

2. The chemical officer must coordinate with the S-2 to ensure that they are presenting the same picture for their respective commanders.

TA 5.4.3 Prepare Tactical Intelligence Reports)

TA.1 MANEUVER BOS

Positive Performance

TREND 1: Scout weapons team (SWT)-level tactics. Small units consistently exercise discipline in the execution of their missions. The SWT members work well in the process of communicating, moving, and shooting. They have a common understanding of proper actions of contact. They are consistently able to coordinate indirect fires, coordinate with ground units to clear direct fires, and report promptly and accurately.

(TA 1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 2: Enter a building, and clear a room. Units across the Army are generally very proficient at clearing rooms in a military operation on urban terrain (MOUT) environment when they are working at the squad level and lower. The techniques outlined in **FM 90-10-1, *An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-Up Areas,*** are usually followed with a high degree of success. This success is primarily the product of Home Station training where the units can exercise the squads in either a MOUT facility or a tire house. The training at Home Station would be even more productive if the facilities incorporated irregular-shaped rooms and included furnishings in those rooms. This would increase both the realism and the difficulty soldiers will face in a MOUT environment.

(TA 1.2.2 Conduct Close Combat)

TREND 3: Enter and clear a trench. Platoons and down are displaying the ability to quickly and efficiently clear trench lines and knock out bunkers. These trenches are often being cleared in two directions at once without suffering a break down in the command and control of the element. The fundamentals of the operation are outlined in **FM 7-8, *Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad,*** and are executed at fairly high levels by units. Incorporating live grenades in trench clearing training at Home Station reduces the hesitation of actually using them.

(TA 1.2.2 Conduct Close Combat)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: React to contact. More live fire training would be required to improve how soldiers react to contact drills.

PROBLEMS:

1. When soldiers are using blank ammunition, these drills are usually quick and effective. When the soldiers are uploaded with live ammunition, there is a great hesitation to conduct these drills with any speed.
2. Squad leaders are very hesitant to reposition soldiers to improve the effectiveness of fires under range conditions.

RESULTS:

1. Soldiers are typically brought on line with the point man and left in that spot whether it is effective or not. This leads to poor use of cover and concealment, as no adjustments are being made, even left and right, to better utilize terrain.

2. When soldiers and leaders are asked why adjustments are not made during the execution, they almost always refer back to the training they receive at Home Station.

3. A common statement overheard concerns the extremely strict control measures that are placed on units. These conditions almost always lead to a range mentality where soldiers are afraid to fire until given permission by an observer/controller (O/C). Also, soldiers typically conduct several rehearsals on the same lane on which they will conduct the operation with live ammunition. The soldiers then pretend they do not know what they are approaching, when in fact they do.

4. This lane recognition leads to entire elements identifying enemy targets and not engaging until they all engage, rather than individuals initiating fires.

Techniques:

1. To prevent a range mentality, units should conduct rehearsals in areas other than the area they will conduct their actual mission in order to promote a realism of response during their mission.

2. **TC 25-8,** ***Training Ranges,*** is a good point of reference for establishing these ranges.

(TA 1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 2: Fire control and distribution.

PROBLEMS:

1. The use of the machine gun is a seriously deficient problem across the light infantry.

2. Units rotating through the Joint Readiness Training Center do not understand the fundamentals of fire control and distribution.

3. Fire commands are common to all automatic weapons systems but are rarely given.

RESULTS:

1. A common theme at the JRTC is assistant gunners not observing and adjusting fires.

2. Soldiers are not using their sights to engage the enemy. M60 machine gun teams are not backfeeding ammunition into containers for rapid loading and firing. They are demonstrating an inability to clear malfunctions in their weapons. This inability to clear malfunctions is magnified at night.

3. These tasks must still be accomplished and there must be someone held accountable in the platoon that has that specific role.

4. The situation in platoons with weapons squads is really not any better.

Techniques:

1. References: **FM 23-14,** ***M249 Light Machine Gun in the Automatic Rifle Role,*** **FM 23-67,** ***M60 Machine Gun***, and **FM 23-65,** ***Browning Machine Gun Caliber .50 HB, M2*** (all refer to fire control and distribution, with an emphasis on the specifics in chapter 6 in each manual).

2. The challenge is to create either a training program or competition that will improve the use of machine guns in the light infantry.

(TA 1.2.1 Employ Direct-fire)

TA.2 FIRE SUPPORT BOS

Positive Performance

TREND 1: Field artillery (FA) battalion S-2's involvement in the brigade targeting process. FA battalion S-2s are becoming increasingly involved in the brigade targeting process, particularly in analyzing, identifying, and pinpointing opposing forces' (OPFOR) mortar locations and caches. The S-2s are attending brigade targeting meetings and are becoming an integral member of the brigade targeting effort.

(TA 2.1.1 Select Target to Attack)

TREND 2: Commander/FSO integration. The *customary relationship of commanders and fire support officers is working well*. Brigade through company commanders and their fire support officers understand the concepts of integrating and synchronizing fires to support the scheme of maneuver. Commanders and their fire supporters are doing an excellent job of determining when fires are critical and where fires must be placed, and of understanding the restrictions for fires to ensure they do not interfere with the scheme of maneuver.

(TA 2.3 Integrate Fire)

TREND 3: Field artillery support plan development. Field artillery battalion staffs are generally producing sound, feasible field artillery support plans that provide subordinate units the specificity needed for mission accomplishment.

(TA 2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Use of the Precision Lightweight GPS (Global Positioning System) Receiver (PLGR).

PROBLEM: During the LIC and deliberate attack, most forward observers (FOs) turn their PLGRs off or leave them in the continuous mode while moving.

RESULT: When the lead element of the platoon makes contact, the FO is unable to utilize the PLGR to immediately and accurately determine the target location.

Techniques:

1. Ensure that the PLGR is turned on and in the continuous mode.
2. Use it upon contact to send the FO's present location and initiate a fire mission utilizing the polar plot call for fire.

3. Implement the techniques described in ***"The PLGR: Techniques and Procedures Forward Observers Can Use To Bring Rapid, Accurate Indirect Fires to the Close Fight,"*** **CALL Newsletter No. 96-10,** Oct 96, ***CTC Quarterly Bulletin, 4th Qtr, FY 96.***

4. Reference: TM 11-5825-29-13.

(TA 2.1 Process Ground Targets)

TREND 2: Company fire support execution matrix (FSEM).

PROBLEMS:

1. Most FSEMs used by the company fire support officer (FSO) are not standard.
2. Lack the sufficient detail to describe the fire support tasks to be executed without further guidance or explanation.

RESULT: FOs, company mortars, and other leaders within the company do not know what indirect fire support assets are available or how to employ what is available.

Techniques:

1. Standardize a FSEM format for all fire support teams (FISTs) supporting a brigade.
2. References:
   - Article No. 4, ***"Fire Support Products for the Company," JRTC Fire Support (FS) Division (DIV) Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)***, 1 Oct 96.
   - **FM 6-20*, Fire Support in the AIRLAND Battle,*** p. 2-7.
   - **FM 6-20-50*, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Light),*** p. 2-15.

(TA 2.1.2 Select Fire Support Attack System)

TREND 3: Utilization of firepower control teams (FCTs). Many units come to JRTC with little or no knowledge of how to employ FCTs.

PROBLEMS:

1. Most units do not train with FCTs at Home Station. They train with them for the first time when they arrive at the intermediate staging base (ISB).
2. Most maneuver commanders do not adequately understand the employment capabilities of FCTs.

Techniques: Employ firepower control teams (FCTs) in one of two ways:

1. *Attach the FCT to a rifle company or a scout platoon* to provide responsive naval gun fires as well as a terminal close air support (CAS) control capability at the company or platoon level. This technique works well when there are limited fire support assets available (for example, during initial insertion or when operating forward of field artillery and/or mortar ranges).

2. *Treat the FCTs independently* during reconnaissance operations. Assign the FCT a named area of interest (NAI) or some other area in which to operate. This gives the maneuver commander more sets of eyes forward to cover more area. This forward employment requires detailed planning for communications, resupply, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), and potential extraction/exfiltration of FCTs when they operate independently and far and/or forward.

(TA 2.1.2 Select Fire Support Attack System)

TREND 4: Q36 operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Field artillery planners too often do not have an adequate understanding of the firefinder radar system to successfully plan and then execute using the system.
2. Too often the *targeting technician*, the fire finder subject matter expert, is not consulted about employment considerations beyond site selection until *after the battle has begun.*
3. Too many field artillery tactical operations centers (TOCs) tend to expect more from the radar than the system can actually deliver.

RESULTS:

1. Units lose critical time and miss key opportunities trying to *execute unrealistic plans.*
2. The lack of planning and execution knowledge hampers unit planning for future operations.

Techniques:

1. Conduct extensive Home Station training with the system so that both operators and planners understand and accept the system's capabilities and limitations.
2. Conduct professional development classes for both officers and NCOs at Home Station. Gauge the level of detail to the target audience.
3. At Home Station, conduct tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) terrain walks to highlight the unique requirements of the system, i.e., optimum mask angles, positioning considerations, and the effects of vegetation and the terrain.
4. Make the *targeting technician* an integral member of the field artillery battalion staff. Bring the targeting technician into the planning process early.
5. Conduct realistic radar training at Home Station, i.e., limited friendly fire and more hostile fire operations.

(TA 2.1.2.1 Determine System Capabilities)

TREND 5: Out-of-traverse/6,400-mil missions. Firing units often experience difficulty executing out-of-traverse missions.

PROBLEMS:

1. Executive officers (XOs) too often fail to derive the minimum quadrant elevation (QE) for each octant.
2. Fire direction centers (FDCs) often fail to compute terrain gun position corrections (TGPCs) for each octant.

3. Often howitzer section equipment, such as the prime mover and/or camouflage netting, prohibits true 6,400-mil capability.

4. Howitzer sections routinely do not emplace their aiming posts correctly.

5. Lack of aiming reference points and pickup displacement for all possible azimuths further inhibits crews from executing out-of-traverse/6,400-mil missions.

6. Gunners and section chiefs are not comfortable using aiming posts to pick up displacement.

7. Units are not using distant aiming points (DAPs) despite their availability.

RESULT: Slow fire mission response times, particularly when responding to counter fire.

Techniques:

1. Doctrinal references: **FM 6-40, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery; FM 6-50, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery***, and the appropriate howitzer -10.

2. Ensure the XO and fire direction center (FDC) understand the requirements necessary for the conduct of out-of-traverse missions, especially for setting up the chart in the FDC to facilitate 6,400-mil operations.

3. Ensure howitzer sections are trained on how to position their alternate aiming reference points and are completely proficient at picking up displacement.

4. Frequently rehearse out-of-traverse dry fire missions in each octant to ensure the firing unit is capable of providing fast, accurate fires.

5. Ensure all unit equipment is positioned to facilitate 6,400-mil operations.

(TA 2.1.3 Prepare Order to Fire)

TREND 6: Howitzer range cards.

PROBLEMS:

1. Too many firing batteries either have no howitzer range card or only a partially completed one.

2. Frequently, howitzer range cards do not contain direct fire targets or data for anti-personnel ammunition (APERS) or Killer Junior.

Techniques:

1. Battery leadership should inspect howitzer range cards during pre-combat checks and inspections to ensure the range card is done to standard.

2. *Reinforce the value* of the direct fire range card for howitzer engagements.

3. Doctrinal reference: **FM 6-50, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery,*** Chapter 3, pp. 3-12.

(TA 2.1.3 Prepare Order to Fire)

TREND 7: Observer plans and use of triggers. Company FSOs are not developing observer plans and trigger points during defensive operations.

PROBLEM: Too many observers are unable to see the target area and do not establish or rehearse a trigger point.

RESULT: Planned fires normally impact after the target has passed through the target area, allowing an enemy element to successfully pass through the defensive sector.

Techniques:

1. Company FSOs must position observers in order to support the defense:
   - In restrictive terrain, place the FO well forward of the company/team (CO/TM) defensive position.
   - Establish an *identifiable* trigger point, based on a projected rate of enemy movement through the sector.
   - Rehearse the optimal position of the FO relative to the trigger once the enemy enters the target area.
2. Read **FM 6-30, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire,*** page 5-25, on the establishment and use of triggers.

(TA 2.2 Engage Ground Targets)

TREND 8: Mortar employment in close contact. Few units are using mortars when contact with the enemy is established.

PROBLEMS:

1. Maneuver unit leaders (platoon and company) are allowing their observers and FSOs to fight with fires prior to maneuvering on the enemy.
2. Company FSOs and platoon FOs are not establishing priority targets with 60-mm and 81-mm mortars along the unit's route.

Techniques:

1. FOs and FSOs should establish targets along the unit's route as they template enemy positions and likely ambush sites.
2. As the unit moves along the route, the FO should cancel one target and establish the next target. *Use the minimum safe distance of the weapon system* designated to signal the shift to a new target.
3. When the unit comes in contact with the enemy, the FO can initiate his priority target or shift from his priority target, placing his fires on or behind the enemy.
4. See ***"Fast, Accurate Fires in the Close Fight"*** by LTC David L. Anderson in **CALL Newsletter No. 96-4,** Mar 96, ***CTC Quarterly Bulletin, 2d Qtr, FY96.***

(TA 2.2.1 Conduct Lethal Engagement)

TREND 9: Accuracy of mortars.

PROBLEMS:

1. FSOs are not providing timely meteorological (MET) data or coordinating for survey (declination) support for the task force's organic mortars.
2. Mortar platoons and sections are not aggressively conducting registrations as a means to improve their accuracy.

Techniques:

1. The battalion FSO should coordinate with the FA battalion S-3 to get meteorological (MET) messages (computer MET if the unit is using the mortar ballistic computer) and survey support. Include the maneuver task force in the FA battalion's priorities of survey support (with the priority going to the main effort task force).
2. The FSO, with the maneuver task force S-3, should establish which units should register the mortars and ensure this tasking is included in the operations order.

(TA 2.2.1.1 Conduct Surface Attack)

TREND 10: Indirect fires during small unit contacts. Infantry platoon leaders and forward observers are reluctant to use indirect fires during small unit contacts.

PROBLEMS:

1. There is a tendency to be overly cautious for fear of fratricide, since the enemy is often only 200-300 meters away.
2. Most fire support teams do not have an established battle drill for this situation. They are not well-trained in the adjustment of fires onto rapidly moving mounted and dismounted enemy.
3. Decentralized "fast" fire missions are rarely seen, particularly during the search and attack phase of operations.

RESULTS:

1. Reduced opportunity to kill the enemy.
2. Most units do not fire the required volume of ammunition in effect to achieve the desired effects on the target.

Techniques:

1. Plan for and *use* artillery and mortar fires to rapidly isolate, block, or defeat enemy forces upon contact.
2. Use priority targets for both mortars and artillery. Selectively use quick fire channels to assist the observer in obtaining "fast, accurate" fire missions.
3. Establish battle drills that immediately get a round on the ground upon contact. Once the round is on the ground, observers should be trained to make one bold, accurate shift and fire for effect.
4. Always give accurate target descriptions, and make sure that the attack guidance is fully understood.

5. FIST training: include engaging close-in targets with fire support while the observer is moving.

6. Train FOs on rapidly determining a target location and initiating a complete call for fire while on the move *and under attack.*

7. Train FOs on the use of the Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR) to rapidly determine a target location in restrictive terrain. See "***The PLGR: Techniques and Procedures Forward Observers Can Use to Bring Rapid, Accurate, Indirect Fires to the Close Fight,"*** **CALL Newsletter No. 96-10,** Oct 96, ***CTC Quarterly Bulletin, 4th Qtr, FY 96.***

(TA 2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 11: Light Tactical Fire Direction System (LTACFIRE) operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Although rotational units consistently maintain digital communications, they rarely exploit the capabilities of the LTACFIRE/Initial Fire Support Automation System (IFSAS).

2. Few units use the LTACFIRE/IFSAS to manage targets, conduct fire planning, and conduct tactical fire direction.

RESULTS:

1. The common results are fire plans that are not disseminated or fired, inefficient use of resources, and failure to meet the commander's attack criteria.

2. Inexperienced operators, along with failure of the chain of command to force the use of the system, are the primary reasons. Although units often have excellent LTACFIRE SOPs, they are rarely used.

3. Digital fire control systems greatly facilitate and ease target management, fire planning, tactical fire direction, and the dissemination of information.

Techniques:

1. To exploit the system, **both** operators and leaders must fully understand the capabilities of the system. Effective LTACFIRE/IFSAS sustainment training, using realistic and demanding operational scenarios, should be established and enforced to instill the necessary confidence to use the system.

2. Incorporate and enforce the use of LTACFIRE/IFSAS during all Home Station training events to ensure that this becomes the primary means of fire control and planning.

(TA 2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TREND 12: Survey operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Survey support is not maximizing the use of all assets.

2. Initial field artillery support plans have done a good job in directing survey support in order of priority to all assets requiring survey control. Unfortunately, the trend is for survey support to cease after the firing batteries and radar are complete.

RESULT: Units exert minimum effort or consideration to assets in the task force, i.e., 81-mm mortars, OH-58D, combat observation and laser team (COLT) targets, routes, and obstacles.

Techniques:

1. Ensure planning in the survey annex in the field artillery support plan encompasses all assets in the task force that require survey.
2. Review **FM 6-2*, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Survey,*** specifically Chapters 14-2, 14-7, 15, and Figure 15-1 (fire support coordination fire support coordination (FSCOORD) checklist).
3. Conduct extensive officer and NCO professional development at Home Station, focusing on the importance of effective survey.

(TA 2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

TA.3 AIR DEFENSE BOS

Positive Performance

TREND 1: Target engagement. Stinger and Avenger teams have consistently shown improvements in target engagement. Crews are spending time at the initial staging base (ISB) and at Home Station conducting drills in accordance with (IAW) **FM 44-18, *Air Defense Employment: Stinger*.** This includes making use of the moving target simulator and establishing battle roster teams.

(TA 3.1 Process Air Targets)

TREND 2: Receive early warning. Air defense units have shown increased proficiency in receiving and tracking early warning data. Teams have a good understanding of how to use early warning and the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) to quickly orient gunners on possible targets. To minimize the number of radios a team requires, units are making use of the Que function of the SINCGARS radio described in TM 11-5820-890-10-4, and rebroadcasting early warning on battery and platoon command nets**.**

(TA 3.1.1 Select Air Targets to Attack)

TA.6 MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS & NUCLEAR/BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL (NBC)

Positive Performance

TREND 1: Production of an NBC annex for the brigade orders. This trend has reversed over the last quarter. Brigade chemical cells come through and produce sound NBC annexes where there once were none. NBC annexes to orders are key to ensuring the sound integration of NBC assets and synchronizing the brigade and battalion NBC actions. **FM 3-7, *NBC Field Handbook***, is a good reference, and many of the successful units are using it as a basis for their NBC annexes.

(TA 6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 2: Avenger emplacement. Crews have demonstrated proficiency at operating the Remote Control Unit (RCU) and digging in the Avenger system to increase survivability. **FM 44-44, *Avenger Platoons, Sections, and Squad Operations,*** Appendix C, includes an outstanding checklist for Avenger reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position.

(TA 6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 3: Plotting chemical attacks. Brigade and battalion NBC personnel continually display a firm understanding of the necessary skills required to plot chemical attacks. They possess a keen understanding of manuals such as **FM 3-3, *Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance,*** and **FM 3-7, *NBC Field Handbook.***

(TA 6.3.2 Employ Operations Security)

TREND 4: Control of lines of communications. Most brigades have recognized that control of ground lines of communication is critical to success in low- to mid-intensity operations. Many are successful in task-organizing for combined arms route clearance and convoy escort operations in accordance with **FM 5-7-30, *Brigade Engineer and Engineer Company Combat Operations*.**

(TA 6.3.2.1.1 Employ Communications Security)

TREND 5: Smoke operations at the platoon level. The majority of platoons effectively employ large area smoke to cover the target area. Troop-leading procedures are generally utilized, resulting in detailed planning and soldiers being informed on the current mission. References: **FM 3-50, *Smoke Operations,*** and **FM 3-101-1, *Smoke Squad/Platoon Operations.***

(TA 6.3.2.2.3 Employ Smoke/Obscurants)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Breaching operations. Heavy teams deploying to JRTC understand breaching fundamentals and tenants.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units continue to poorly execute combined arms breaching of buried minefields in restrictive terrain.
2. Tank crews are not fully trained on the capabilities and proper employment of counter-mine equipment (mine plows and rollers).

Technique: Armor and mechanized units conduct pre-deployment breach training in restrictive terrain using buried minefields detectable only by detonation or with mine-detection equipment.

(TA 6.1.1.1 Breach Obstacles)

TREND 2: Route clearance and mine awareness. Despite some success in predicting minefield locations, units continue to suffer considerable loss due to enemy mines.

PROBLEMS:

1. There is a lack of minefield awareness among leaders and drivers (many vehicles are lost in minefields that have been marked by earlier units).
2. A lack of proficiency in clearing minefields and a general lack of reaction when minefields are reported to the tactical operations center (TOC). Despite an enemy who very predictably caches mines within 300 meters of his minefields and overwatches with infantry, few units see a minefield as an indicator of enemy activity.

RESULTS:

1. Units do not include minefield locations into their targeting process or commit maneuver forces based on the presence of mines.
2. Enemy forces regularly reseed minefields that are detected and cleared by friendly units, then ignored. In some cases, this scenario persists for a period of days and results in multiple mine strikes and casualties.

Technique: Commanders must exercise tactical patience during route clearance operations and allow engineer leaders to analyze the situation to determine the proper method to facilitate route clearance.

(TA 6.1.1.1.1 Breach Minefields)

TREND 3: Combined arms obstacle integration.

PROBLEMS:

1. Brigade and battalion staffs do not understand the fundamental relationship between fires and obstacles outlined in **FM 90-7, *Combined Arms Obstacle Integration*.**
2. Infantry leaders are not proficient in siting tactical obstacle groups to influence enemy maneuver.
3. Soldiers are not proficient in emplacing protective obstacles.
4. Obstacle emplacement is not tracked at battalion level, so the commander does not adjust his plan based on actual battlefield conditions.

RESULTS:

1. This results in poor execution of defensive operations.
2. Direct and indirect fires are not integrated with the obstacles.
3. Obstacle construction is unnecessarily delayed because infantry units are slow to occupy sectors or battle positions, directed obstacles are not used to support battalion/brigade decisive points, and engineers are routinely tasked to operate battalion Class IV/V points.
4. This lack of adjustment results in minimal delay of assaulting enemy forces.

Techniques:

1. Review **FM 90-7, *Combined Arms Obstacle Integration*.**
2. Conduct reconnaissance as early as possible during the defense. Site critical, directed obstacles so that engineer effort is not wasted while the staff completes the operations order.
3. Establish procedures that require the task force S-4 and support platoon leader to operate and supervise the Class IV/V supply point.
4. Task maneuver companies with responsibility for obstacle group construction in order to ensure that engineers receive assistance with mine dump operations and protective wire emplacement.
5. Comply with obstacle reporting requirements outlined in **FM 20-32, *Mine/Countermine Operations.***

(TA 6.2.2 Emplace Obstacles)

TREND 4: Positioning of crew-served weapons.

PROBLEMS:

1. Batteries and platoons routinely do a poor job of identifying enemy capabilities and taking the necessary force protection measures to eliminate or counteract the threats of positioning crew-served weapons.
2. Units do a poor job of positioning crew-served weapons, placing them in positions that restrict movement and operation.
3. Too often the crew-served positions lack interlocking fires.
4. Units fail to clear fields of fire.

5. Units select positions with little or no consideration about *dead space, enemy avenues of approach, difficulty in clearing fields of fire, hill masses that block fields of fire, etc.*
6. Too many soldiers do not understand how to fill out a range card.
7. Too many soldiers do not know how the traverse and elevation mechanism functions.
8. NCOs do not proactively supervise and train their soldiers on crew-served weapons.

RESULT: Batteries and platoons are often destroyed by a dismounted attack conducted by as few as three to five enemy soldiers.

Techniques:

1. Doctrinal references: **FM 6-50*, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery,*** Chapter 3, and **STP 6-13B14-SM-TG,** pg. 3-6.
2. Ensure all soldiers and leaders are trained on crew-served weapons emplacement, range card construction, clearing fields of fire and, most importantly, positioning crew-served weapons to maximize effectiveness given the constraints of the terrain.
3. Consider identifying crew-served weapon positions prior to the howitzer positions. This technique can greatly facilitate battery defense without affecting the battery's subsequent occupation.
4. Crew-served weapon positions should be inspected/checked by a senior leader battle commander (BC) or 1SG to ensure the weapon is being used effectively. This check should be conducted by actually getting behind the weapon and ensuring it is set up correctly.

(TA 6.3.1 Provide Battlespace Hazard Protection)

TREND 5: Force protection and perimeter defense. Protecting the force is every leader's concern and essential to sustaining the force.

PROBLEMS:

1. Individual and crew-served weapon positions are not completed to standard, often lacking overhead cover.
2. The use of obstacles is non-existent.
3. Camouflage of personnel, tents, vehicles, and equipment are seldom to standard.

RESULT: The improvement of assembly areas fails to occur after initial occupation.

Techniques:

1. All leaders and soldiers should review **FM 7-8*, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad,*** and **FM 5-103, *Survivability,*** for techniques and standards for defensive measures.
2. **FM 20-3, *Camouflage,*** gives company-level leaders an understanding of camouflage principles.
3. An assembly area plan must be developed and continually improved upon.
4. Constructing survivability positions for all soldiers enhances combat survivability.

5. Leaders must ensure that force protection is a priority and that the aviation task force is included in the brigade task force defensive plan.

(TA 6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 6: Survivability operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Individual soldiers do not know the standards for individual and crew-served weapon fighting positions. These positions are almost always substandard and frequently dangerous to the soldiers that occupy them.
2. Leaders are not familiar with collective survivability and force protection requirements outlined in **FM 5-103, *Survivability,*** and the force protection planning process described in **FM 5-114, *Engineer Operations Other Than War*** and **Joint Publication 3-10.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Base Defense*.**
3. Frequently units do not construct viable survivability positions for critical systems such as artillery batteries, counterfire radars, TOCs, signal nodes, aviation assembly areas, and ammunition transfer points, leaving them vulnerable to ground and air attack.

RESULTS:

1. Cursory berming, rather than digging, is the norm.
2. Camouflage measures are rarely used outside immediate tactical operations center (TOC) areas.

Technique: Train leaders and soldiers on survivability standards in accordance with **FM 5-103, *Survivability*.**

(TA 6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 7: Reaction to NBC threats.

PROBLEMS:

1. Most units lack a well-thought-out NBC plan.
2. A common problem is the lack of basic NBC knowledge and a plan that delineates actions to take upon and after the attack (to include unmasking procedures).

RESULT: When presented with an NBC threat, the chain of command falls apart and chaos reigns supreme.

Technique: FM 3-4, *NBC Protection*, provides information on NBC protection. Although the FM provides a wealth of information on NBC, chapters 2 and 3 provide outstanding basic information to help thought and planning processes.

(TA 6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 8: Force protection. Military Intelligence (MI) soldiers' deaths due to fratricide and poor force protection measures are on the increase.

PROBLEMS:

1. Teams moving throughout the brigade area of operations (AO) are not coordinating properly for no fire areas (NFAs) nor are they relaying final location grids to their controlling headquarters in a timely manner.
2. Leaders are not enforcing force protection measures such as fighting positions, overhead cover, and security patrols.

RESULT: Four out of five MI teams engaged by the JRTC OPFOR are being destroyed by enemy artillery without ever firing a shot in defense.

Techniques:

1. The tactical operations center (TOC) must be apprised of unit location and situation on a continuous basis.
2. The leadership at all levels must impose discipline in force protection methods and procedures. The unit SOP should describe the standard for a position defense, and this standard should be enforced.

(TA 6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 9: Sensor employment and operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units do not make effective use of forward area air defense (FAAD) command, control, communications, and intelligence (C^3I) sensors, simplified handheld terminal units (SHTUs), or handheld terminal units (HTUs).
2. Often sensors are placed in positions that do not allow for line-of-sight conductivity with SHTUs/HTUs.

RESULT: Teams and the units they support do not receive early warning data.

Techniques:

1. **FM 44-48*, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Sensor Platoon,*** outlines sensor employment guidelines as well as technical capabilities and limitations that must be considered in early warning planning.
2. Units should make use of the 14J operator in the planning process to help maximize the use of the sensor.

3. Effective use of the FAAD C^3I system allows for situational awareness of all team locations to aid in battle tracking. Units must also ensure all communications exercises include FAAD C^3I nets to ensure communications equipment is operational and conductivity is achieved down to the gunner level.

(TA 6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment)

TREND 10: Checkpoint operations.

PROBLEM: Units have a poor understanding of checkpoint purpose, procedures, construction, and the required force protection measures needed by armor/cavalry units.

RESULT: Checkpoints are not set up to a standard, and checkpoint operations result in weak security across the brigade's area of operations and contribute to the alienation of the civil population and host nation government.

Technique: FM 71-1, ***Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team,*** **ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP,** and **ARTEP 17-57-10 MTP** provide adequate standards for pre-deployment training.

(TA 6.3.2 Employ Operations Security)

TREND 11: Base and base cluster operations.

PROBLEM: Corps support group commanders and battalion commanders are not, for the most part, familiar with base and base cluster operations.

RESULT: Most commanders have trouble assimilating their units to base cluster operations and defining responsibilities. The common problem is the lack of knowledge on base and base cluster operations.

Technique: FM 54-30, ***Corps Support Groups,*** pages 11-6 through 11-15, provide detailed information on rear operations to include sample worksheets for base defense plans. **FM 100-15,** ***Corps Operations,*** pages 2-7, 2-8, and 5-15, and Appendix C provide more information on rear operations.

(TA 6.3.4 Provide Counterreconnaissance, Security, and Readiness)

TA.7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS

Positive Performance

TREND 1: Unit-level maintenance procedures. Units are successful in maintaining operational readiness rates well above 90 percent during their JRTC rotations. This is due to the maintenance focus of the unit commanders, maintenance officers, and platoon sergeants. The maintenance managers do a very good job of balancing their maintenance requirements with their tactical requirements. The positive attitude of the aircraft mechanics and crewchiefs are generally reinforced by the unit leadership and aircrews taking the time to assist in maintenance operations.

(TA 7.3.2 Fix/Maintain Equipment)

TREND 2: Preventive medical support. Preventive medicine detachments are improving in their provision of area support. They are actively interacting with the rotational brigade as well as the units within the base cluster.

(TA 7.4.1 Distribute)

TREND 3: Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) operations. The evacuation liaison team (ELT) accompanying the forward support MEDEVAC team (FSMT) continues to be a success in solving the command, control and communications (C^3) problems which historically hinder the FSMT. The ELT provides the personnel and communications equipment necessary to establish proper control and liaison for the FSMT. The ELT is capable of coordinating all ground and nonstandard air evacuation casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) for the brigade. The ELT provides the ability to have MEDEVAC representation at key planning and rehearsal meetings. The single, most-important contribution of the ELT has been its ability to establish and maintain a dedicated casualty evacuation control net.

(TA 7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 4: Brigade use of a brigade evacuation liaison team (BELT) to coordinate and prioritize aerial evacuation assets. The use of the BELT during medical evacuation operations to coordinate aviation assets gives the medical company tremendous capability. The BELT must be located in a position to allow the CINC medical evacuation to utilize their capabilities and communicate priorities. The BELT must be part of the planning process and have access to a detailed casualty estimate. Reference: **FM 8-10-6, *Medical Evacuation in a Theater of Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*.**

(TA 7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 5: Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) operations. CASEVAC operations were a positive trend this quarter due in part to emphasis on certified combat lifesavers at the squad and team levels. In addition, the platoons brought highly skilled medics.

(TA 7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 6: Flexibility and willingness to learn. The majority of the Military Police (MP) platoons possessed a terrific attitude and strong desire to learn new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) as well as practice old ones. Most platoons possessed tremendous flexibility and confidence which contributed to outstanding mission success.

(TA 7.4.5 Train Tactical Units and Personnel)

TREND 7: Use of through-put and rotary-wing assets for Class IV and V distribution in the defense. The use of ground and air assets in distribution of defensive barriers material is key in reducing double handling. The utilization of through-put from the division support areas (DSA) via ground and air helps to relieve some of the timing issues, as well as free up some of the brigade's limited transportation assets. The use of through-put must be synchronized with the ground tactical plan and the obstacle plan. The aerial assets are best utilized in conjunction with ground transportation concentrating on delivery of tactical obstacle packages early and transitioning to protective packages as the company and battalion positions become identified. A highly successful technique is to palletize tactical barrier packages on Palletized Load System (PLS) flatracks to be sling-loaded forward to the Class IV/V distribution points. Upon arrival at the distribution points, utilize the PLS prime movers and forklifts to break bulk. Reference: **FM 100-10*, Combat Service Support,*** Chapter 2.

(TA 7.5.1.2.2 Move by Air)

TREND 8: Sustainment operations. Historically, sustainment operations are a positive trend at JRTC. This sustainment begins with the initial coordination before deployment and continues through the actual operational sustainment during the rotation. The platoon sergeant shoulders the bulk of the sustainment operation to include all classes of supply and personnel. Unit success can be attributed to the platoon sergeant's knowledge of the supply system and rapport with the supported brigade.

(TA 7.5.2 Supply the Force)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Patient evacuation.

PROBLEM: Units are unable to quickly load and unload ground and air ambulances to standard upon arrival at JRTC.

Techniques:

1. Commanders need to drill personnel in the loading and unloading techniques for all types of air and ground vehicles while at Home Station.

2. **All** unit personnel should be trained in litter team techniques in the event that rotating rosters have to be established for on-call litter team duty.

3. Reference: **FM 8-10-6,** ***Medical Evacuation in a Theater of Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures,*** provides instruction on litter team techniques and standards for both air and ground evacuation vehicles.

(TA 7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 2: Preventive medicine.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units continue to routinely fail to leave proper distances between latrines and food service facilities.

2. They fail to establish handwashing facilities immediately upon site occupation.

Technique: FM 21-10-1, ***Unit Field Sanitation Team,*** provides all the standards concerning construction, emplacement, and requirements for latrines and handwashing devices.

(TA 7.4.4.3 Provide Preventive Medicine)

TREND 3: Live-fire use of hand grenades and AT-4s.

PROBLEMS:

1. Limited exposure by soldiers to live hand grenades and AT-4s has a direct and obvious impact on the effectiveness of their use.

2. The Expert Infantryman's Badge (EIB) standard of putting an AT-4 into operation is almost always done well. It is the aiming and actual firing of the missle with which soldiers struggle.

3. Soldiers almost never adjust the sights on the AT-4 from the factory settings.

RESULTS:

1. Soldiers are very hesitant to throw the live grenades in anything but a very structured, range-type situation. Soldiers will consistently throw one in ten hand grenades short because of a lack of training.

2. The same is true with the use of the AT-4.

3. This leads to the missile being fired high on almost every instance. The situation becomes even worse when conducting night operations with AT-4s.

Technique: A review of **FM 23-25,** ***Light Anti-Armor Weapons,*** Chapter 6, talks about how to effectively employ anti-armor weapon systems at night.

(TA 7.4.5 Train Tactical Units and Personnel)

TREND 4: Limited visibility operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units are not enforcing the use of night-vision devices (NVDs). The number of night-vision devices that the typical platoon or company has is usually adequate, but soldiers are hesitant to put them into operation.
2. Units, such as those stationed in Alaska, have a unique training challenge in to how to conduct limited visibility training while incorporating night-vision devices, but they are the exception.

RESULTS:

1. In addition to the normal night-vision goggles, soldiers are not aware that they can use flashlights in specific situations.
2. Across-the-board limited visibility training is deficient and it shows.

Technique: Units should take every opportunity, including Home Station training, to use NVDs. Procedures for use of flashlights and other illumination should be specifically addressed in the unit SOP.

(TA 7.4.5 Train Tactical Units and Personnel)

TREND 5: Setup of the dismount point.

PROBLEM: Units fail to provide shelter near the dismount point for use by civilians on the battlefield (COB). This shelter should provide protection from weather and comfort items such as coffee and water. It also provides an area for noncombatants to go to while gate guards get guidance or escort personnel.

Technique: FM 8-10*, Health Services Support in a Theater of Operations,* Chapter 3, Section IV, and **FM 27-10*, The Law of Land Warfare,*** Chapter 4, Section II, provide guidance on the laws of land warfare concerning health service support.

(TA 7.6.1 Perform Rear Area Restoration)

TREND 6: Enemy prisoner-of-war operations.

PROBLEMS:

1. Doctrinally, Military Police (MP) are responsible for the proper handling, processing, safeguarding, and reporting of all enemy prisoner of war/civilian internees. Due to limited MP assets, the brigades, at times, do not require the MP platoon to conduct enemy prisoner-of-war/civilian internee (EPW/CI) operations.
2. The brigades do not maintain and forward the required forms (DD Form 629, Receipt of Prisoner or Detained Person; DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document; and DA Form 5976, Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag or local equivalent) for EPW/CI accountability.

RESULTS:

1. The MI company performs the mission assisted by the forward support battalion (FSB), and the brigade fails to provide the division with the required information, logs, and status reports on EPW/CI.

2. Proper controls and accountability for EPW/CI are not followed.

Techniques:

1. Military Police must be involved in EPW/CI operations. If there are other operational requirements for the MP platoon, it is advisable to require at least MP supervision/advisement over the processing and reporting.

2. The platoon should enforce the guidelines for processing EPW/CI IAW the company and division TACSOP. References: **FM 19-4,** ***Military Police Battlefield Circulation Control, Area Security, Enemy Prisoner of War,*** and **STP 19-95B1-SM** (Task No. 191-376-4101).

(TA 7.7.1 Perform PW Operations)

TREND 7: Civilians on the Battlefield (COB).

PROBLEMS:

1. Most units are unfamiliar/untrained in dealing with civilians on the battlefield. This ranges from the unnecessary use/display of force to permitting civilians free access to the position area and allowing them to disrupt unit activities.

2. Another common occurrence is for the unit to call battalion for guidance whenever civilians show up at the perimeter. Frequently, the battalion takes an inordinate amount of time to decide what it wants the unit to do with civilians.

RESULTS:

1. These actions unnecessarily anger friendly/neutral civilians and allow neutral/anti-U.S. civilians a significant opportunity to collect valuable intelligence (where the C^2 nodes are, possible targets for terrorist activities, etc.).

2. Frequently, terrorists will gain unobstructed access to a battery and will destroy the BOC/FDC or howitzer section through the detonation of a ruck sack or car bomb.

Techniques:

1. Develop and disseminate to the lowest level a "white/gray/black" list of all pro/neutral/anti-civilians and clear, concise guidance of what actions are to be taken with each type of civilian as well as civilians not on any list.

2. Establish clear procedures on what soldiers are to do upon contact with civilians; train and rehearse soldiers on how to deal with COB at Home Station.

(TA 7.9 Evacuate Noncombatants from Area)

TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS

Positive Performance

TREND 1: Military Intelligence company commander's participation in the brigade battle staff. MI company commanders continue to be aggressive participants in the brigade-driven military decision-making process (MDMP). They take an active role in developing intelligence electronic warfare (IEW) task organization in accordance with the brigade scheme of maneuver. *Regular and timely communications* between company commanders and members of the battalion staff *are critical to the successful synchronization of operations*. Units regularly use FM communications and established control measures to allow "on-the-fly" coordination between maneuver elements and staff.

(TA 4.1 Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status)

TREND 2: The use of digital devices within the battey. Battery fire direction centers (FDCs) are consistently maintaining digital communications with the battalion FDC. They are processing and transmitting fire missions to the gun line using lightweight computer equipment (LCU) gun display unit (GDU) link.

(TA 4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 3: FM communications. Recent rotations have demonstrated an increased improvement in maintaining FM communications over long distances. The proper use of retransmission (retrans) has significantly improved the battalion/task force's ability to maintain C^2 throughout the battlefield. The apparent emphasis on pre-combat inspections and proper planning in the selection of retrans locations have combined to ensure that the commander can communicate with his unit.

(TA 4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 4: Unit communications. MI soldiers are displaying increased proficiency in the use of FM communications and field expedient antennas. Low-level voice intercept (LLVI) and ground surveillance teams are maximizing the range of SINCGARS radios and continue to use the automated net control devices (ANCD) to standard. Company-level communications specialists (31U) routinely maintain consistent communications with organic multiple subscriber radio telephone (MSRT) and have little problems patching into the mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) network with digital network voice telephones (DNVTs).

(TA 4.1.1.2 Receive and Transmit Enemy Information)

TREND 5: SINCGARS operations. Operator skills with the SINCGARS radio seem to improve every quarter. Frequency-hopping radio nets are now the standard; just a few years ago, many units still used the SINCGARS radio in single-channel mode. PLGR time, the doctrinal standard, has begun to see wide use for net timing, and this has had marked benefits. Operator-level troubleshooting skills have also seen dramatic improvement over the past year. However,

net control stations (NCSs) must begin to pay better attention to monitoring the *time drift* on their master radios and over-the-air rekey (OTAR) procedures. A solid operator certification program at Home Station is the key to SINCGARS operation.

(TA 4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 6: Improved liaison operations. Heavy team liaison officers (LOs) are deploying with adequate personnel and equipment to conduct 24-hour operations. Heavy team LOs are integrated into the brigade staff and performing duty as a subject matter expert/special staff officer during the MDMP.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 7: Integration of the chemical cell into the tactical operations center (TOC) at the brigade level. A majority of the NBC cells at brigade level are well integrated into TOC operations and tied into the brigade battle staff's designated battle rhythm. **FM 100-5, *Operations,*** and **CALL Newsletter No. 95-7,** May 95, ***Tactical Operations Center,*** provide good information on brigade-level TOC operations.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 8: Firing battery movement order. The use of the movement order by the battery leadership is being briefed IAW the XO's Handbook, *addressing specific and implied tasks.* Battery leaders brief movement routes utilizing start points, checkpoints, and release points. When higher HQs do not issue start points, checkpoints, and release points, the battery leadership identifies their own, facilitating movement command and control.

(TA 4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 9: Medical task force interaction. Interaction with civilians on the battlefield continues to improve. Units that teach Rules of Engagement (ROE) to guard force personnel and continue to emphasize changes to the ROE have favorable outcomes during these scenarios. Flexibility is the key.

(TA 4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1: Use of the chemical officer.

PROBLEMS:

1. In an abundance of rotational units at both brigade and battalion levels, the chemical officer is used as a battle captain and the NCO is used as a TOC NCO or RTO (or a combination of other duties above his NBC duties).
2. In the initial phase of operations this is acceptable, but as the NBC threat escalates, a transition must occur. Chemical personnel must be allowed to execute their duties as the brigade or battalion's NBC expert. Calling chemical personnel after an attack is too late.

RESULT: The chemical personnel are not allowed the time that other battle staff members have been allowed to plan, coordinate, integrate, and synchronize the NBC effort.

Technique: FM 100-5*, Operations*, and **FM 3-100*, NBC Defense, Chemical Warfare, Smoke and Flame Operations,*** outline the duties that chemical personnel must accomplish and the processes they must be allowed to accomplish.

(TA 4.1 Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status)

TREND 2: Collection focus.

PROBLEM: The Military Intelligence company leadership does a poor job in developing IEW specific information requirements (SIR) and special orders and requests (SOR) for dissemination to collection assets.

RESULTS:

1. Teams routinely execute missions with PIR only after limited execution guidance from their chain of command.
2. Soldiers do not understand what their specific collection taskings are.

Technique: MI company leaders must include SIR/SOR backbriefs as part of their standard rehearsal procedure.

(TA 4.1.1.2 Receive and Transmit Enemy Information)

TREND 3: NBC warning and reporting.

PROBLEM: Warning and reporting systems in rotational units are dysfunctional. During chemical attack,s it takes up to one or more hours to receive the initial NBC report with any type of usable information.

RESULT: Chemical personnel often delay taking any type action until this report is received. The key is “don’t delay.” If the chemical officer has conducted a thorough IPB and a strike has happened in a templated area, he can then start taking some action in response to the attack.

Techniques:

1. A good tool that assists TOCs and chemical personnel in dealing with chemical attacks is the “BATTLE DRILL.” This provides focus for everyone in the TOC and causes a pre-selected number of actions to be executed with the chemical officer as the center of focus.
2. One condition of the battle drill is the submission of a NBC 1 report to higher headquarters. The NBC 1 report will provide the chemical officer with the necessary information to identify the hazard that confronts him.
3. **FM 3-7*, NBC Field Handbook,*** and **FM 3-3*, Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance,*** address the required information for a good NBC 1 report.

(TA 4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 4: Managing communications.

PROBLEM: Command and control rehearsals are often no more than a commander's backbrief, with a poor communication exercise.

RESULT: Neither the communications procedures nor the hardware are properly exercised.

Techniques:

1. A C^2 rehearsal has key leaders working around a terrain cloth, using either man-pack or remote communications systems. Each key leader should have the correct amount of systems by phase (i.e., the Combat Team 6 might have two SINCGARS RTs and a S/C TACSAT when he assaults, and three SINCGARS RTs and a remote MSRT operating from his C^2 vehicle). Replicating the C^2 console and any RETRANS nets are key elements.
2. The remainder of the combat team also participates in the C^2 rehearsal, but they are away from the terrain cloth. To ensure enough radio assets exist for each net, all nets are established simultaneously.
3. Soldiers who will perform duties at the net control station (NCS) should establish the nets. Soldiers should be prepared to conduct calls for fire and MEDEVAC requests on order at *any* time during the rehearsal. Critical events, such as passing the battle between the TACs and the TOCs (to include handover of NCS duties and SINCGARS master timing) and changing from the combat aviation net (CAN) to unit command nets should also be rehearsed.
4. The rehearsal exercises the unit's compromise procedures and OTAR. The C^2 rehearsal should last 24 hours (although the key leaders will only be involved for the first two hours). This allows sufficient time for the SINCGARS NCSs to verify that their RT is not "drifting" excessively.

(TA 4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 5: Integration of slice elements (communications) at the intermediate staging base.

PROBLEM: Slice element communications are not properly integrated into the combat team at the ISB.

RESULT: Signal planners in the higher headquarters are often unaware of the extensive and unique assets that slice elements bring with them. Slice elements at a typical training center rotation represent a mix of communications configurations and procedures including the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP), Air and Naval Gun Fire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), civil affairs and PSYOP teams, the MSE Signal Company, air defense assets, Armor/Mechanized Team, MI Company, and Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE).

Techniques:

1. The higher headquarters should provide a complete set of SOPs to the slice element that includes a one-page "cookbook" highlighting key procedures, drills, and codewords.

2. The signal planner at the higher headquarters should develop a slice integration checklist. The checklist should include an equipment density (by model, i.e., A-model SINCGARS radios), battery requirements, and a communicator PAX density.

3. The signal planner should also coordinate with a slice representative and make an assessment of operator skill level (SINCGARS, MSE, S/C TACSAT, etc.) in the slice, and discuss how doctrinally the slice C^2s itself and arrays itself on the battlefield.

4. The final element of successfully integrating slice communications is a solid C^2 rehearsal. The C^2 rehearsal de-conflicts frequencies, ensures interoperability of equipment, confirms that slice elements understand the various communications codewords and procedures, and verifies that the combat team's C^2 architecture is understood. For the signal planner, a successful C^2 rehearsal indicates that the communications capabilities of the slice elements have been best incorporated into the plan.

(TA 4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)

TREND 6: Tactical operations center (TOC) situational awareness.

PROBLEM: Aviation TOCs do not accurately and systematically battle-track their own assets or assets of the brigade.

RESULT: The lack of constant updating of friendly locations makes air-to-ground integration difficult. TOC battle-tracking charts are also not updated, making them useless to commanders for decisionmaking. Logs are poorly maintained without a method to track ongoing, critical, or incomplete entries. Finally, graphics are not constantly updated to reflect the latest changes.

Techniques:

1. The solution to these battle-tracking problems must focus on good unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) and enforcement of those procedures by the TOC NCOs.

2. Reference: **CALL Newsletter No. 95-7,** May 95, ***Tactical Operations Center,*** provides some examples of standardized tracking methods and techniques to improve battle tracking.

(TA 4.1.3 Issue Planning Guidance)

TREND 7: Staff integration and air defense planning.

PROBLEM: Platoon leaders are experiencing difficulty in TOC integration and staff coordination. Often orders are not produced at the platoon level because platoon leaders are not integrated with the battalion staff and the planning process.

RESULT: Air defense teams are often sent to position with very little information and, subsequently, become casualties.

Techniques:

1. Platoon leaders must become familiar with the military decision-making process (MDMP) as outlined in ST 100-9. Effective use of the checklist outlined in ST 100-9 will help generate

the necessary products for staff integration as well as aid in the production of warning orders, platoon orders, and necessary fragmentary orders.

2. Effective use of radio telephone operators (RTOs) and platoon sergeants will help the platoon leader plan future operations and execute current operations.

3. Reference: **CALL Newsletter No. 95-12,** May 97, ***Military Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning."***

(TA 4.1.3 Issue Planning Guidance)

TREND 8: Communications Security (COMSEC) procedures.

PROBLEMS:

1. When a real or suspected compromise occurs, unit personnel do not have procedures for assessing the impact of the compromise or developing recommendations for the commander.
2. Once a suspected or known compromise occurs, the unit cannot assess the impact.

RESULTS:

1. Units cannot make an informed decision because they do not know what COMSEC was involved.
2. Once a suspected or known compromise occurs, the unit must have a council that is prepared to assess the impact on unit operations.

Techniques:

1. Signal officers need to develop a battle tracking system for COMSEC and net IDs in each radio. This system cannot be static, as elements will tend to change/increase net IDs in their radios as operations expand.
2. At a minimum, the signal officer should be aware of every ANCD on his battlefield and the contents of each ANCD.
3. Once a suspected or known compromise occurs, the unit must have a council that is prepared to assess the impact. This council should include representatives from tactical intelligence and C^2. The council determines what was compromised, how the compromise might be exploited by friendly/enemy forces, and the impact of an over-the-air rekey (OTAR) on current/future operations. The council prepares both an assessment of the compromise and a recommendation for the commander. The recommendation may include continued normal operations, continued operations with enemy monitoring, changing net identification (IDs), and a delayed or an immediate OTAR. An ill-advised quick fix for compromises is to change the Julian Date on SINCGARS nets. This should not be an option. This action runs the risk of isolating the unit from assets across boundaries (particularly general support (GS) elements or aviation). Any unit entering the area of operations (AO) or theater after a Julian Date change may be electronically isolated for a period of time.

(TA 4.1.3 Issue Planning Guidance)

TREND 9: Battle tracking and reporting.

PROBLEMS:

1. Commanders habitually have difficulty in making sound, timely decisions due to a lack of available information.
2. Units in contact often delay reporting their situation until well past the point where a decision by the higher echelon could have influenced the battle.

RESULTS:

1. Often the vital piece of information is in possession of the unit, but is not part of the commander's decision process because it was not reported or was lost somewhere in the battle-tracking system.
2. The hesitation to report is compounded by the all-too-frequent disappearance of information within the TOC or TAC.

Technique: A clear, universal understanding of the commander's critical intelligence requirements (CCIRs) and effective information management techniques within TOCs/TACs can greatly reduce the danger of making decisions without the benefit of all the available critical information.

(TA 4.1.3 Issue Planning Guidance)

TREND 10: Initial-entry operations medical care.

PROBLEMS:

1. The brigade S-1, in conjunction with the medical planners, are doing a poor job of making a detailed casualty estimate.
2. This estimate is not in reference to the ground tactical plan and the enemy threat.

Techniques:

1. The brigade S-1, in conjunction with the medical planners, must do a detailed casualty estimate.
2. Once the estimate is complete, the medical planners need to echelon medical support and evacuation assets to meet requirements generated by the estimate.
3. The key to execution of the plan is to utilize the combat health service officer (CHSO) or the Charlie company commander to command and control evacuation and treatment assets. If the CHSO is utilized for the C^2 role, ensure he/she has the experience to execute and control the plan.
4. Reference: **FM 8-10-6*, Medical Evacuation in a Theater of Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.***

(TA 4.2.2 Project Future Requirements)

TREND 11: Forecasting requirements in planning.

PROBLEM: The Class VIII system is not well integrated across the battlefield.

Techniques:

1. At the outset of the exercise, medical task force commanders need to ensure integration of the MEDLOB battalion forward distribution team (FDT), the Level III hospital medical supply, and the rotational brigade's Charlie company of the forward support battalion (FSB).

2. The goal should be to ensure that all real-world Class VIII needs are identified and reported in a timely manner.

3. Logistical personnel also need to educate both clinical and administrative personnel regarding the limitations of the Class VIII system during holidays, weekends, and at exercise closure.

4. Forecasting is imperative! **FM 8-10*, Health Services Support in a Theater of Operations,*** Annex A, discusses the C^2 relationship concerning Class VIII in a theater of operations.

(TA 4.2.2 Project Future Requirements)

TREND 12: Brigade battle rhythm.

PROBLEM: Brigade-level organizations have been ineffective in establishing a battle rhythm that maximizes planning time at the subordinate unit level.

RESULT: Commanders and subordinate leaders at all levels have not had the ideal planning time necessary for the planning and execution of orders.

Techniques:

1. Brigades must strive to conduct targeting meetings to direct operations for execution at company level 36 to 48 hours from the time orders and FRAGOS are issued.

2. Brigades must develop a battle rhythm using targeting meetings as the basis to develop the rhythm consistent with the time standards listed above.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 13: Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

PROBLEMS:

1. Aviation staffs continue to struggle with the decision-making process.
2. The recent trend depicts staffs that have a very general knowledge of the planning process.

RESULTS:

1. In the JRTC environment, the staffs usually attempt to execute an abbreviated process.
2. However, without a sound understanding of the military decision-making process and continuous updating of products, the staff squanders its most precious resource -- time.
3. When time is short, the first things to be omitted are rehearsals and clear guidance to subordinate commanders.

Techniques:

1. Executive officers, who normally focus on logistical issues, must become the acting chief of staff and fulfill his leadership duties in accordance with (IAW) **FM 101-5*, Staff Organization and Operation*.**

2. The staff must train the MDMP at Home Station to the point of it being a battle drill. Finally, SOPs must contain procedures for assembling the staff and detailed instructions on conducting an abbreviated planning process.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 14: Air assault planning and execution.

PROBLEM: Air assault planning and execution are not being performed to standard in accordance with (IAW) **FM 1-113*, Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations,*** and **FM 90-4*, Airmobile Operations.***

RESULT: Often one or more phases of the air assault process are neglected during the preparation and planning phases, resulting in poor execution of the air assault.

Techniques:

1. For a successful air assault, the planning process must be centralized with decentralized execution. The initial planning conference (IPC), air mission brief (AMB), and the air crew brief (AB) must be completed to standard and a checklist utilized to achieve maximum success.

2. Leaders at all levels should be reminded that the battalion is the lowest level that possesses the necessary staff and planning assets to execute a successful air assault.

3. Units should review the air assault planning process to ensure they have an adequate understanding of the complete process.

4. Commanders must ensure all leaders are familiar with the air assault process, both current and emerging doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

5. All leaders need to enforce the use of checklists during preparation, planning, and execution and hold all soldiers accountable to the standard **heavy LO packages.**

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 15: Heavy team integration during low-intensity conflict (LIC) operations.

PROBLEM: During low-intensity combat operations in restrictive terrain, heavy teams are assigned a task/purpose, task organization, and command relationship that fails to maximize their capabilities of mobility, protection, and firepower or provide adequate support for the brigade's movement to contact/search-and-attack operations.

Techniques:

1. Effective armor operations in restrictive terrain require combined arms task organization. Attach light infantry or OPCON aviation assets to heavy teams for operations in restrictive terrain.

2. Task and purpose for armor units should maximize use of available counter-mine equipment (mine plows and rollers, mechanized engineer platoon). **FM 71-1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team,*** lists the following doctrinal missions or operations for heavy teams.

- Open and secure routes
- Conduct Convoy Escort
- Establish Checkpoints
- Deliberate and Instride Breach
- Task-organize Bradley or cavalry fighting vehicle platoons or sections to light infantry companies for use as a fixing or finishing force during search and attack operations to maximize the potential of the 25-mm chain gun as a light infantry support weapon.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 16: Medical task force integration.

PROBLEM: Medical task force integration continues to be a problem within the medical task force for all units that deploy to JRTC.

RESULT: At the outset of the operation, task force structure is often not well defined or understood by the C^2 element or those units subordinate to the task force. However, events such as mobile aeromedical staging facility (MASF) missions, battle damage assessment (BDA), logistical support, and internal tasking requirements, often serve as catalysts in forcing units to act as a single functional element rather than acting as independent units. See **FM 8-10, *Health Service Support in a Theater of Operations,*** for a discussion of command and control functions.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 17: Staff planning.

PROBLEM: Staffs need to be trained in the military decision-making process (MDMP).

RESULT: Staffs rarely use the process for any mission other than the initial occupation.

Techniques:

1. All missions should be analyzed and staffed using the MDMP to ensure that planning continues to be synchronized.
2. References: **FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations,*** and **FM 8-55, *Planning for Health Service Support,*** Chapter 2, provide detailed information on this process.
3. Reference: **CALL Newsletter No. 95-12,** May 97**, *Military Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning."***

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 18: Integration of battalion task force engineers.

PROBLEMS:

1. Attached engineer platoon leaders are not well integrated into the battalion TOC and staff planning process. The relative inexperience of an engineer second lieutenant who also serves as a platoon leader contributes to the difficulty of integration and synchronization.
2. Battalion staff officers do not assist the engineer in performing his duties as a staff member.

RESULTS:

1. The engineer is either not consulted at all during planning or is assigned to the TOC and not allowed to supervise and synchronize execution.
2. The end result is poor synchronization of mobility and survivability operations at battalion level.

Techniques:

1. Task force commanders and staffs must accept that the supporting task force engineer cannot be present in the TOC at all times.
2. The task force executive officer must ensure that the supporting task force engineer is integrated into the MDMP and targeting process. The task force engineer must support task force planning and aggressively supervise his platoon during execution.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 19: Effective use of time.

PROBLEM: Leaders are not making effective use of time to allow subordinates to conduct necessary troop-leading procedures.

RESULTS:

1. Poor time management often leads to poor supervision of any pre-combat checks or inspections.
2. Teams often get into position without proper equipment or any situational awareness.

Techniques:

1. **FM 44-44*, Avenger Platoon, Section, and Squad Operations,*** Appendix D, contains numerous checklists to assist in conducting troop-leading procedures and pre-combat checks.
2. Leaders need to make use of warning orders with timelines to assist subordinates in parallel planning. The use of formatted backbriefs will also facilitate information dissemination and concurrent planning.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 20: The targeting process and targeting meetings.

PROBLEM: Most brigade and battalion staffs do not understand the basic concept of the targeting process and intermittently conduct targeting meetings with no agenda and focus.

RESULT: Most units fail to focus combat power to find, fix, and finish critical high-payoff targets (HPTs).

Techniques:

1. Read and review **FM 6-20-10*, The Targeting Process*** (with emphasis on Chapters 2 and 5), and the Targeting Process video script in the ***JRTC FS DIV TTP Red Book,*** 1 Oct 96, page 21, to gain a better understanding of the targeting process and meeting.

2. The battalion XO should open the meeting by detailing its purpose, the agenda, and specifying the time period or event being discussed.

3. The S-2 provides an intelligence update, briefs the current enemy situation, and reviews the current collection, reconnaissance, and surveillance plans. The S-2 then provides a battle damage assessment (BDA) of targets previously engaged since the last targeting meeting and the impact on the enemy courses of action. He follows the BDA with an analysis of the enemy's most probable courses of action and locations for the next 12 to 24 hours using the event template and a list of high-value targets. Finally, the S-2 briefs changes to the priority intelligence report (PIR) for review by the battle staff.

4. The next briefer is the S-3. He briefs any particular guidance from the commander and changes to the commander's intent. He briefs any requirements from higher headquarters since the last targeting meeting and a review of current operations. Finally, he informs the battle staff on the status of assets available for the targeting process.

5. The final briefer is the fire support officer (FSO). He briefs the status of all delivery assets and reviews the current target synchronization matrix, providing a summary of results of actions taken. He provides the new target synchronization matrix with the proposed list of high-payoff targets (HPTs) and locations for the battle staff's concurrence and refinement. Once any changes to the HPT have been made and any locations updated or refined, the maneuver XO or S-3 facilitates a BOS crosswalk to complete the rest of the matrix by identifying a detector, determining an attack means, and assigning an asset to assess each HPT.

3. Upon completion of the targeting meeting, the XO, S-3, S-2, and FSO should brief the commander on the results of the targeting meeting for approval. Once the results are approved, the following products are updated, written, and reproduced for timely distribution:

- Target synchronization matrix
- FRAGO to subordinate units
- Updated target list
- Updated R&S plan
- Any changes to commander's PIR.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 21: Battle rhythm.

PROBLEMS:

1. The lack of a clear battle rhythm at battalion and brigade levels regularly results in a series of haphazard FRAGOs published at unpredictable times.
2. Battalion staffs plan no more than a few hours into the future, meaning that companies generally have little or no time between receipt of mission and the required execution time.

RESULTS:

1. FRAGOS that direct subordinate units to conduct missions in a hurry come to be seen as emergency operations at the company and platoon levels.
2. The effect of short-term planning is magnified at the platoon level, where a platoon order with more than a vague concept of the company operation is rare.

Technique: To be effective, battalion staffs must be looking at least 24 hours into the future, not planning this afternoon's activities**.**

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 22: Wargaming.

PROBLEMS:

1. Units continue to experience problems during execution that can be traced back to flawed wargaming during the planning process. Most staffs execute the wargaming procedure, but do not fully understand why the action-reaction-counteraction methodology is used and what result/product is required before proceeding to the next critical event.
2. Usually, the S-2 and S-3 fight it out at the map board while the remainder of the staff observes in silence. Following the wargaming session, the Battle Operating System representatives (BOS reps) scramble to create their own plans that will support what the battalion wants to do.

RESULT: Mission execution consistently breaks down as enemy actions and friction reveal the lack of coordination and flexibility in the plan. Wargaming is the methodology all units employ in an attempt to synchronize the effects of the BOS they have integrated into the plan.

Techniques:

1. Synchronization lies in the ability to accurately reduce battlefield activities and their effects to specific time factors, and then successfully plan, schedule, and coordinate these activities to occur at the desired time and place.
2. The staff must specifically identify all critical battlefield activities across the BOS, estimate the time and distance factors for execution, and understand the mutually supporting relationships among them.
3. To effectively and efficiently execute these processes, each staff officer must be an expert in his branch/operating system and come to the wargaming session with the complete

understanding of his BOS capabilities/limitations and the proper tools to determine/calculate task planning factors.

4. The planning staff should again war-game each of their training missions during staff training immediately following completion of the event. Capitalize on hindsight to prompt identification of critical battlefield activities across the BOS and train (or teach) the individual staff responsibility for determination/calculation of task planning factors. Experiment with methods (avenue, belt, box) and recording techniques (narrative, worksheet, synch matrix).

5. The executive officer must facilitate the wargame and also enforce the standard for staff participation/input.

6. References: **FM 7-20*, The Infantry Battalion,*** pp. 2-18 to 2-20; **FM 101-5*, Staff Organization and Operations,*** pp. 5-16 to 5-24; ***Commander's Guide for the Coordination and Employment of Battlefield Operating Systems,*** pp. 2-38 to 2-41.

(TA 4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 23: Company-level operations orders.

PROBLEMS:

1. Company commanders struggle with the appropriate level of detail needed in paragraph three of the operations order.

2. They are generally not specific enough in the level of detail in discussing the critical tasks associated with the mission being conducted. Units do a very good job of briefing paragraphs one, two, four, and five. Most units have good to very good orders checklists in their tactical SOPs.

RESULTS:

1. The area of emphasis at company/troop level needs to be more focused on developing a well-defined commander's intent and supporting it with a detailed scheme of maneuver.

2. The units usually brief the commander's intent and then restate the mission task as the scheme of maneuver. For example:

MISSION: A/1-23 Cavalry conducts zone reconnaissance from Phase Line (PL) Red to PL White, NLT 101000 DEC 97, to locate all enemy dismounted forces in zone and identify potential battle positions for the 1st Brigade.

COMMANDER'S INTENT: The troop will conduct zone reconnaissance to locate all enemy dismounted forces in zone and identify potential battle positions for the 1st Brigade.

SCHEME OF MANEUVER: We will conduct zone reconnaissance from PL Red to PL White with an line of departure (LD) time of 1000. Team 1 will be in the west, team 2 will be in the east.

3. The lack of detail by unit commanders frequently leads to a lack of mission focus during the conduct of the mission.

Technique: Company commanders must remember that the mission statement must include a concise and accurate task and purpose and that the scheme of maneuver must include the detailed method on accomplishing that task and purpose.

(TA 4.3.1 Issue Planning Guidance)

TREND 24: Use of available planning time.

PROBLEMS:

1. A recent trend during offensive operations has been to purposely sacrifice planning time to initiate an offensive operation earlier than the enemy anticipates.
2. Typically, battalions use 6 to 10 hours to conduct battalion-level troop-leading procedures, then give from 2 to 8 hours for company and platoon-level preparations.

RESULT: Company orders are unclear about the plan below the battalion level and platoon orders that offer almost no resolution on how the platoon will accomplish its own mission.

Technique: Although the early initiation of operations offers some benefits to the commander, he must recognize and be willing to accept a significant reduction in planning and preparation at the subordinate unit levels.

(TA 4.3.1 Issue Planning Guidance)

TREND 25: Fire support rehearsals.

PROBLEMS:

1. Once units depart the intermediate staging base, rehearsals are poorly conducted and seldom provide benefit to the operation.
2. Fire supporters are not integrated into the "maneuver" rehearsal as recommended in **FM 7-20, *The Infantry Battalion,*** and most fire support rehearsals result in only a confirmation of the planned target list.

RESULT: Rehearsal techniques listed in **FM 6-20-1, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Cannon Battalion,*** are not being used.

Techniques:

1. Develop a sound SOP to cover the essential elements of a rehearsal.
2. Integrate fire support into the "maneuver" rehearsal. Each commander and FSO should succinctly describe the actions as each unit fights with maneuver and fires.
3. The FSO must be able to describe what enemy or maneuver action will trigger a specific fire support task/event. A walk-on terrain model is usually worth the required time to construct it.

4. Review FM 6-20-1, pages 3-12 through 3-15. This source provides an excellent overview of key rehearsal elements. A solid SOP, checklist, or agenda, reinforced by Home Station training, would greatly improve rehearsals.

(TA 4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans)

TREND 26: Command and Control (C^2) Rehearsal/Communication Exercise (COMMEX) in the Initial Staging Base (ISB).

PROBLEM: C^2 rehearsals in the ISB are often no more than a commander's backbrief, and the COMMEX regularly deteriorates into signal soldiers passing radio traffic on a single net to confirm COMSEC and radio net timing.

RESULT: The C^2 rehearsal (whose sole proponent is all too often the signal officer) does not receive the proper attention, and combat operations suffer.

Techniques: A successful C^2 rehearsal has four components.

1. The most important component of a C^2 rehearsal is participation of the commander and his staff. Without this support, the rehearsal is a failure.
2. The next major component is that the C^2 rehearsal has a clear purpose. The purpose of the C^2 rehearsal is to expose flaws or disconnected activities in the plan, focus on actions and decision points critical to the mission, ensure that subordinate commanders explicitly understand their mission, and instill confidence in the participants.
3. The communication exercise is a major component. At the completion of a proper C^2 rehearsal, the signal planner can turn to the commander and give him a green light on all communications systems and procedures within the combat team.
4. The last component of a successful C^2 rehearsal is the plan. Current signal doctrine does not include information on planning or executing a C^2 rehearsal.

(TA 4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans and Orders)

TREND 27: Rehearsals.

PROBLEM: Units frequently rehearse prior to operations, but often never move beyond generic or leader-only rehearsals. Surveys over the past two quarters reveal that at the company level, rehearsals cover all mission-essential tasks to be performed only 8 percent of the time, while companies conduct no rehearsals 39 percent of the time. At the platoon level, leaders rehearse all mission-essential actions 19 percent of the time and neglect rehearsals completely 27 percent of the time.

RESULT: The lack of rehearsals specifically tailored to the tasks to be performed often results in reduced proficiency during the mission.

Technique: Reference **CALL Newsletter No. 98-5,** Mar 98, ***Rehearsals.***

(TA 4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans and Orders)

TREND 28: Control of the brigade rear battle.

PROBLEM: Command and control (C^2) of the brigade rear battle is being passed to the forward support battalion (FSB) tactical operations center (TOC). If the FSB TOC controls the brigade rear battle, the brigade must provide augmentation to the FSB TOC.

RESULT: The brigade rear battle must be synchronized and integrated with the brigade plan. The brigade has to resource the FSB with a dedicated cell that consists of the appropriate level of assets to battle track.

Technique: This cell must include dedicated communications, intelligence and fire support equipment, and personnel. Reference: **FM 7-20*, The Infantry Brigade.***

(TA 4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)

TREND 29: Chemical asset integration.

PROBLEM: Many brigades are not using NBC assets with the best possible task and purpose.

RESULTS:

1. Decontamination, smoke, and reconnaissance assets are repeatedly left performing missions such as convoy escort, ROWPU security, manning TCPs, and troop transportation missions. These are viable missions when no NBC threat is present, but as the situation changes and the threat warrants, NBC assets must be employed in their doctrinal roles enhancing force protection.
2. There are many instances where smoke assets could be combat multipliers but are often omitted.
3. Additionally, instances of units being slow in relinquishing control of chemical assets (platoon is a part of the FSB perimeter and the commander not wanting to give up the asset) when directed, therefore hindering the NBC fight. By the time a persistent chemical strike happens, decontamination response is slow because the decontamination plan never matured. This is basically a result of the brigade not executing proactive decontamination site reconnaissance.

Techniques:

1. Chemical officers must stress the proper utilization of NBC assets during the planning of operations and then check to ensure that assets are being utilized as intended. Situational awareness is paramount, and a thorough understanding of upcoming operations are the keys to integration of NBC assets.

2. Reference: **FM 3-100*, NBC Defense, Chemical Warfare and Flame Operations,*** gives a good basis for the doctrinal employment of NBC assets.

(TA 4.4.1.2 Coordinate Support)

TREND 30: Platoon battle drills.

PROBLEM: Some platoons have difficulty aggressively executing battle drills.

RESULT: The soldiers react to the contact and leader's direct action, but many times the reaction is slow and unrehearsed.

Techniques: Reacting to contact should be instinctive, immediate, and rehearsed. Units should train on battle drills outlined in **ARTEP 19-100-10, DRILL,** and those developed for internal TACSOPs.

(TA 4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinates)

TREND 31: Commander's guidance for fire support.

PROBLEM: Most commanders are using the format in **FM 6-71*, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander,*** while writing their guidance for fire support using Purpose, Priority, Allocation and Restriction (PPAR). Recently, some commanders have started using Task, Purpose, Method and Endstate.

RESULTS:

1. Although FSOs are using the correct formats, many FSOs are poorly conveying the commander's guidance for fire support.
2. The terms *destroy, neutralize, suppress, and harass* are not being used properly. The commander's guidance for fire support is usually vague, does not focus fire support assets, and is not supportable with the fire support assets available.

Techniques:

1. **FM 6-71*, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander,*** pg. 3-5, lists the information commanders should provide their FSOs. FSOs must clearly understand the commander's intentions and guidance for the use of fires.
2. **FM 6-20-10*, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process,*** states that the effects of fire can be to harass, suppress, neutralize, or destroy the target. The subjective nature of these terms means the FSO must ensure his commander's interpretations of this terminology are realistic and equally understood, and that the commander has the fire support assets available to achieve his attack guidance.
3. FSOs must fully understand the concept of operations and the commander's intentions for the use of fires. FSOs must translate this into clear, concise and understandable terms.

(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 32: Staff integration and synchronization.

PROBLEMS:

1. At Home Station, the platoon leader, company commander, and division provost marshal should conduct informal NCOPD/OPD at brigade on MP capabilities and employment. They must also ensure that the platoon leadership understands how the brigade uses the tactical decision-making process to plan operations.

2. Platoon leadership must understand where and how they provide input in the planning process to integrate and synchronize MP support into the operation. Then leaders must be able to take that information given to the brigade and produce combat orders for the platoon so junior leaders can begin their troop-leading procedures and parallel planning. The platoon leader must ensure that MP assets are included in the brigade's TACSOP. He must also ensure that his recommendations on the appropriate doctrinal MP missions, command relationship, and task organization are used by the staff in developing the plan for the brigade operation. Combined arms operations and working with host-nation police will improve operations as well as information sharing and intelligence collection.

3. Proper integration and synchronization of MP assets will prevent many of the 911 missions which are uncoordinated, unplanned, and unrehearsed.

RESULTS:

1. Many unnecessary casualties and lost critical assets are the result of 911 missions. At Home Station, the provost marshal, commander, and platoon leader should conduct continuous leader/staff training at brigade on MP capabilities and employment.

2. The MP annex to the TACSOP should describe capabilities, employment considerations, doctrinal missions, prioritization, and specific collective tasks that support the brigade mission-essential task list (METL) tasks.

Technique: The platoon leader must also ensure that his recommendations on the appropriate doctrinal MP missions, command relationship, and task organization are used by the staff in developing the plan for the brigade operation. Combined arms operations and working with the host-nation police will improve operations as well as information sharing and intelligence collection.

(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 33: Synchronization of indirect fires.

PROBLEM: The almost universally poor results obtained by indirect fires are largely attributable to the lack of a workable observer plan tied to clearly defined trigger points.

RESULT: Most U.S. fires during the past two quarters have landed harmlessly behind (in terms of space or time) enemy forces. When viable enemy targets are identified, the lack of pre-planned targets that are tied to triggers is compounded by the lack of clear maneuver graphics to identify clearance responsibilities. The two shortfalls combine to produce indirect fires that are far too slow and cumbersome to be effective.

(TA 4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)